The district court held that his claim was nonjusticiable. The U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed. Judge Williams, writing for the court, determined that the constitutional language granting the Senate the "sole Power to try all impeachments" also "gives it sole discretion to choose its procedures. This "textual commitment of impeachment trials to the Senate," coupled with the need for finality, led the court to apply the political question doctrine in determining that the issue presented by former Judge Nixon was nonjusticiable.
Judge Randolph, in his concurrence, framed the question before the court as "whether the judiciary can pass upon the validity of the Senate's procedural decisions.
My conclusion that the courts have no such role to play in the impeachment process rests on my interpretation of the Constitution. His analysis seems to focus specifically upon the text of the constitutional grant to the Senate of the sole power to try impeachments and upon the framers' intentional exclusion of the Judiciary from a role in the impeachment process, rather than upon the political question doctrine. Judge Edwards concurred in the judgment but dissented in part.
He would have found former Judge Nixon's constitutional challenge justiciable, but would find "that the Senate's use of a special committee to hear witnesses and gather evidence did not deprive Nixon of any constitutionally protected right. The Nixon case was decided by the Supreme Court on January 13, Nixon v. The Court held the issue before them to be nonjusticiable. The Chief Justice based this conclusion upon the fact that the impeachment proceedings were textually committed in the Constitution to the legislative branch.
In addition, the Court found the "lack of finality and the difficulty in fashioning relief counsel[led] against justiciability. To open "the door of judicial review to the procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would 'expose the political life of the country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.
The Court found that the word "try" in the Impeachment Clause did not "provide an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, emphasized the significance of the framers' decision to assign the impeachment power to the legislative branch.
Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment, but found nothing in the Constitution to foreclose the Court's consideration of the constitutional sufficiency of the Senate's Rule XI procedure. Justices White and Blackmun, addressing the merits of the claim before the Court, were of the opinion that the Senate had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to "try" Judge Nixon. Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, although his reasoning was somewhat different.
The Impeachment Trial Clause commits to the Senate "the sole Power to try all Impeachments," subject to three procedural requirements: the Senate shall be on oath or affirmation; the Chief Justice shall preside when the President is tried; and conviction shall be upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.
It seems fair to conclude that the Clause contemplates that the Senate may determine, within broad boundaries, such subsidiary issues as the procedures for receipt and consideration of evidence necessary to satisfy its duty to "try" impeachments.
Justice Souter found the conclusion that the case presented a non-justiciable political question supported by the "'the unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,' [and] 'the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements from various departments on one question. Carr , U. He noted, however, that.
In such circumstances, the Senate's action might be so far beyond the scope of its constitutional authority, and the consequent impact on the Republic so great, as to merit a judicial response despite the prudential concerns that would ordinarily counsel silence. The court there framed the question before it as follows:. The key issue in this case is whether a life-tenured Article III judge who has been acquitted of felony charges by a petit jury can thereafter be impeached and tried for essentially the same alleged indiscretion by a committee of the United States Senate consisting of less than the full Senate.
This court determines that the answer is no. Judge Sporkin determined that his court was not foreclosed from reaching a decision in the Hastings case by what might have been viewed as a controlling court of appeals decision in Nixon , because the Supreme Court had agreed to take certiorari in Nixon on issues identical to those before him.
Judge Sporkin concluded that the issue before him was justiciable and, further, that the Rule XI procedure did not provide an adequate "trial" before the full Senate. In particular, the court considered the taking of evidence a process which required the presence of all the Senators, so that each could judge credibility with his or her own eyes and ears.
Judge Sporkin stayed his judgment pending appeal. After the Supreme Court's decision in Nixon v. United States, supra , the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, on its own motion, vacated and remanded the Hastings decision for reconsideration in light of Nixon.
Hastings v. On remand, Judge Sporkin dismissed the case. In doing so reluctantly, Judge Sporkin emphasized the factual differences between the two cases, but concluded that the Nixon decision compelled dismissal of the case before him. Also of great assistance in exploring precedents in this area is Deschler's Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, ch.
Holmes Brown and Charles W. Senate conduct of impeachment trials is governed by the "Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials. Claiborne, although many of the rules predate the Claiborne impeachment. August 15, , was prepared at the time of the Claiborne proceeding pursuant to S. As these are Senate rules, that body can, where it deems such action appropriate, revise or amend the rules.
Consideration of the appropriateness of such revisions is not unusual when a Senate impeachment trial is anticipated or is at a very early stage of the Senate proceedings.
In any impeachment inquiry, the Members of the legislative branch must confront some preliminary questions to determine whether an impeachment is appropriate in a given situation. The first of these questions is whether the individual whose conduct is under scrutiny falls within the category of President, Vice President, or "civil Officers of the United States" such that he is vulnerable to impeachment. One facet of this question in some cases is whether the resignation of the individual under scrutiny forecloses further impeachment proceedings against him.
A second preliminary question is whether the conduct involved constitutes "treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors. In the history of the United States, 16 full impeachment trials have taken place. Delahay, of the U. District Court for the District of Kansas, was begun when the Members of the House appeared before the bar of the Senate to impeach the judge at the end of the third session of the 34 th Congress.
No articles of impeachment were presented at that time. After the judge resigned, there were no further proceedings. An 18 th Senate trial, that of George W. English, U. District Judge for the Eastern District of Illinois, was commenced in the Senate, but did not go forward to a judgment on the merits of the case because of the judge's resignation and the House Managers' recommendation and the Senate's agreement that the impeachment proceedings be dismissed.
Similarly, a 19 th Senate trial, regarding Samuel B. Kent, U. District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, ended when the Senate agreed to a motion by Senator Harry Reid to dismiss the articles of impeachment after the judge resigned and the House Managers requested that the impeachment proceedings be discontinued.
In addition to those impeachment investigations which have resulted in Senate trials, there have been a number of instances in which the impeachment process has been initiated in the House of Representatives that have not resulted in articles of impeachment being voted against the subjects of those inquiries.
For example, in , the House of Representatives adopted a resolution authorizing the House Committee on the Judiciary to investigate the conduct of District Judge Mark H. Other examples of impeachment resolutions, inquiries, or investigations regarding federal judges that, for various reasons, 59 did not result in articles of impeachment being voted by the House include those regarding: Lebbeus R.
United States , Ct. Constitution and 2 challenging the constitutional validity of a one-House veto provision in the Federal Salary Act of , 2 U.
No further action was taken. Among the inquiries into conduct of executive branch officers which did not result in Senate trials were those regarding: H. Daugherty ; Clarence C. Mellon, as Secretary of the Treasury discontinued before completion of the investigation because of Mellon's resignation from the position of Secretary of the Treasury upon his nomination and confirmation as Ambassador to the Court of St. Nixon President's resignation occurred before the Articles of Impeachment were voted upon by the House; report of the Judiciary Committee recommending impeachment and including articles of impeachment submitted to the House; House adopted a resolution accepting the report, noting the action of the committee and commending its chairman and Members for their efforts, but no further action was taken upon the impeachment ; and Andrew Young, United States Ambassador to the United Nations measure considered in House; motion to table passed by House.
The following are examples of those which went no further than committee or subcommittee referral: resolution to impeach the Ambassador to Iran referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution to impeach United States Ambassador to the United Nations referred to House Judiciary Committee ; resolution directing House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether to impeach Attorney General of United States referred to House Rules and Administration ; resolutions to impeach the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary ; resolutions to impeach members of the Federal Open Market Committee and referred to Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee ; resolutions to impeach President Ronald Reagan and referred to House Judiciary Committee ; and resolutions to impeach President George W.
Bush two in , one in , two in referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary ; a resolution impeaching Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr referred to House Judiciary Committee ; 63 a resolution directing the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake an inquiry into whether grounds existed to impeach President William Jefferson Clinton, to report its findings, and, if the committee so determined, a resolution of impeachment referred to House Committee on Rules ; 64 a resolution to impeach Secretary of Defense Donald R.
Gonzales should be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors referred to the House Rules Committee. As is apparent from the instances noted above, the impeachment mechanism, while not used frequently, has provided a means of exploring allegations of misconduct involving, with the one notable exception of Senator Blount, civil officers from both the judicial and executive branches. The bulk of the inquiries begun have not resulted in impeachment trials; of those which have gone to trial, less than half of them have led to convictions, all involving federal judges.
The impeachment process provides a means of monitoring and checking misconduct by such officials through the use of a legislative forum. The mechanism is a cumbersome one which takes time away from other legislative business. Yet its very cumbersomeness might be viewed as necessary to minimize the chance that so serious a course would be engaged in lightly; in this light, its complex and somewhat unwieldy nature could be considered an attempt to deter unwarranted legislative intrusions into the business and personnel of the other two branches.
The impeachment process might be seen as a constitutional effort to balance these two countervailing forces. A perusal of the examples included in the list of impeachment trials and of inquiries with an eye towards possible impeachment may provide some indication as to what sort of officials have been considered "civil Officers of the United States" within the scope of the impeachment powers.
The term is not defined in the Constitution. With the exception of the trial of Senator Blount, all of those listed above were from either the executive or the judicial branch. Senator Blount was not convicted in his impeachment trial. During that trial the Congress wrestled with the question of whether a Senator was a civil officer subject to impeachment. The Senate concluded that he was not and that it lacked jurisdiction over him for impeachment purposes.
He was acquitted on that basis. Clearly the precedents show that federal judges have been considered to fall within the sweep of the "Civil Officer" language. There have been instances where questions have been raised as to whether the congressional printer, 66 a former vice-consul-general, 67 or a territorial judge 68 could be impeached. In addition, a House committee concluded that a Commissioner of the District of Columbia was not a civil officer for impeachment purposes.
II, Sec. He shall Reliance in this argument is placed upon a statement of the Supreme Court in United States v. Mouat , U. Unless a person in the service of the government hold his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of one of the courts of justice or heads of departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.
It is clear that a private citizen is not subject to impeachment, except as to those offenses committed while holding federal public office. Belknap resigned just prior to the adoption of impeachment articles by the House. The Senate, after having given exhaustive consideration to the arguments of the House managers and counsel for the respondent, concluded that the former Secretary of War was amenable to trial by impeachment for acts done in that office, despite his resignation from office before he was impeached.
Belknap's demurrer to the replication of the House on the ground that the Senate lacked jurisdiction to go forward with the impeachment was therefore overruled.
The second fundamental issue which each Congress contemplating impeachment of a federal official must confront is whether the conduct in question falls within the constitutional parameters of "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
III, Sec. The Constitution requires that a conviction on a charge of treason be supported by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession in open court. The statutory language expressly applies only to those owing allegiance to the United States. Bribery is not defined in the Constitution, although it was an offense at common law, and the First Congress enacted a bribery statute, the Act of April 30, , 1 Stat.
The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" is not defined in the Constitution or in statute. It was used in many of the English impeachments, which were proceedings in which criminal sanctions could be imposed upon conviction. As Alex Simpson, Jr. No definitive list of types of conduct falling within the "high crimes and misdemeanors" language has been forthcoming as a result of this debate, but some measure of clarification has emerged.
Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 appears to anticipate that some of the conduct within this ambit may also provide grounds for criminal prosecution. It indicates that the impeachment process does not foreclose judicial action. Its phrasing might be regarded as implying that the impeachment proceedings would precede the judicial process, but, as is evident from the impeachments of Judge Claiborne in , and of Judges Hastings and Nixon in and , at least as to federal judges and probably as to most civil officers subject to impeachment under the Constitution, the impeachment process may also follow the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
Whether impeachment and removal of a President must precede any criminal prosecution is as yet an unanswered question. The debate on the impeachable offenses during the Constitutional Convention in indicates that criminal conduct was at least part of what was included in the "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors" language.
For example, Judge John Pickering was convicted on all four of the articles of impeachment brought against him. Among those charges were allegations of mishandling a case before him in contravention of federal laws and procedures: 1 by delivering a ship which was the subject of a condemnation proceeding for violation of customs laws to the claimant without requiring bond to be posted after the ship had been attached by the marshal; 2 by refusing to hear some of the testimony offered by the United States in that case; and 3 by refusing to grant the United States an appeal despite the fact that the United States was entitled to an appeal as a matter of right under federal law.
However, the fourth article against him alleged that he appeared on the bench in an intemperate and intoxicated state. Judge Halsted Ritter was acquitted of six of the seven articles brought against him. He was convicted on the seventh, which summarized or listed the first six articles and charged that the "reasonable and probable consequences of the actions or conduct" involved therein were "to bring his court into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in the Federal judiciary, and to render him unfit to continue to serve as such judge.
This article was challenged unsuccessfully on a point of order based upon the contention that article VII repeated and combined facts, circumstances and charges from the preceding six articles.
It has been suggested that the impeachment provisions and the "good behaviour" language of the judicial tenure provision in Article III, Sec. Print, September 17, , as cited in 3 Deschler's ch. These concepts shared some common ground. As the Subcommittee observed:. Both concepts would allow a judge to be impeached for acts which occur in the exercise of judicial office that 1 involved criminal conduct in violation of law, or 2 that involved serious dereliction from public duty, but not necessarily in violation of positive statutory law or forbidden by the common law.
Sloth, drunkenness on the bench, or unwarranted and unreasonable impartiality [sic? When such misbehavior occurs in connection with the federal office, actual criminal conduct should not be a requisite to impeachment of a judge or any other federal official. While such conduct need not be criminal, it nonetheless must be sufficiently serious to be offenses against good morals and injurious to the social body.
Both concepts would allow a judge to be impeached for conduct not connected with the duties and responsibilities of the judicial office which involve [sic] criminal acts in violation of law. Thus it would appear that this common ground represented those general principles which the Subcommittee deemed fundamental to conduct upon which impeachment of a federal judge could be based.
In connection with the impeachment of Judge Samuel B. Kent, the House Judiciary Committee, in H. The House and Senate have both interpreted the phrase broadly, finding that impeachable offenses need not be limited to criminal conduct. Congress has repeatedly defined "other high Crimes and Misdemeanors" to be serious violations of the public trust, not necessarily indictable offenses under criminal laws.
Where a judge's conduct calls into question his or her integrity or impartiality, Congress must consider whether impeachment and removal of the judge from office is necessary to protect the integrity of the judicial branch and uphold the public trust.
There is no constitutional parallel to the judicial "good behaviour" language applicable to executive officials. The House Judiciary Committee, in recommending articles of impeachment against President Richard Nixon in , appears to have premised those articles on the theory that President Nixon abused the powers of his office, causing "injury to the confidence of the nation and great prejudice to the cause of law and justice," and resulting in subversion of constitutional government; that he failed to carry out his constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the laws; and that he failed to comply with congressional subpoenas needed to provide relevant evidence for the impeachment investigation.
Two of the articles brought against the President asserted that he sought to set aside the rightful authority of Congress and to bring it into reproach, disrepute and contempt by "harangues" criticizing the Congress and questioning its legislative authority.
The only other executive branch officer to go to trial on articles of impeachment was Secretary of War Belknap. The articles alleged that he, in an exercise of his authority as Secretary of War, appointed John Evans to maintain a trading post at Fort Sill, and allowed Evans to continue in that position, as part of an arrangement which provided Belknap personal gain. Belknap resigned before the Senate trial on his impeachment and was not convicted on any of these articles.
The House has impeached and the Senate has tried a federal judge based upon articles of impeachment alleging misconduct committed in his then current federal offices and misconduct committed while he was serving in his previous federal office.
In , in response to H. Department of Justice of charges of improper conduct by Judge Robert W. Archbald, which had been brought to the President's attention by the Commissioner of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Archbald was impeached by the House and tried by the Senate in the 62 nd Congress, he was a U. Commerce Court. The articles of impeachment brought against him alleged misconduct in those positions as well as in his previous position as a U.
District Judge. Some other allegations of misconduct occurring in both prior and current federal offices have been investigated by the House with an eye toward impeachment. For example, on March 1, , after investigating the administration of the office of consulate-general in Shanghai, China, during the terms of George F. Seward, former consul-general and then current envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the United States of America to China, and two others, a Member presented to the House the report of the majority of the Committee on Expenditures in the State Department, consisting of 17 articles of impeachment alleging misconduct by Seward both while consul-general in Shanghai and while minister to China.
In recommending a resolution impeaching Seward for high crimes and misdemeanors while in office, the committee referred to him in both his former and then current official capacities. The House, on March 3, , the last day of the 45 th Congress, voted to consider the report, but dilatory proceedings thereafter prevented any action on it.
In connection with the same investigation, on March 22, , the House Committee on Expenditures in the State Department reported a recommendation that Oliver B. Military officers—who face discipline under the military code—are not subject to impeachment, nor are members of Congress, a precedent established in There was considerable debate at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia over the definition of impeachable crimes.
Initially, the founders said the president and others could be removed by impeachment and conviction for "corrupt conduct" or "malpractice or neglect of duty. The debate did not stop there because the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" left the matter of impeachable offenses open to interpretation. Since the ratification of the Constitution in , the definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors" has plagued members of Congress, lawyers, and legal scholars alike.
The framers borrowed the term "high crimes and misdemeanors" from British law, wherein it referred to crimes by public officials against the government. In practical terms, as Representative Gerald Ford said in , "An impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history. Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach. The House, however, does not have the power to remove an impeached individual.
That duty goes to the Senate, which holds a trial and decides whether to convict and remove or acquit. Impeachment begins when the House adopts a resolution calling for an investigation by a House committee into charges against the official in question. The committee may recommend impeachment or dismissal. The House then votes, by simple majority, to approve or dismiss articles of impeachment. Following approval, the House appoints managers to conduct the impeachment trial in the Senate.
The House then passes a resolution informing the Senate about the articles of impeachment and the names of the House managers who will bring the case before the Senate.
When the Senate receives the resolution, that body advises the House when it will receive the managers and begin the impeachment trial. The Senate becomes the court with the president of the Senate presiding, except when the person impeached is the president, in which case, the presiding officer is the chief justice of the Supreme Court. To convict and remove an impeached individual from office requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate. The penalty for impeachment is a trial in the Senate.
Because impeachment is the same as an indictment, there is no other penalty, except perhaps to one's reputation. Impeachment, as discussed above, only requires a simple affirmative majority in the House of Representatives. The Constitution requires a two-thirds affirmative vote in the Senate to convict an impeached person. The penalty for conviction is removal from office. The Senate also has the option, by simple majority vote, to disqualify the official from holding public office in the future.
There is no appeal to impeachment or conviction because it involves a political rather than criminal question. Of the 20 federal impeachment proceedings since , 10 have occurred in the past years. Impeached officials included 15 federal judges, three presidents, one senator, and a cabinet secretary the secretary of war.
These impeachments resulted in seven acquittals, eight convictions all judges and they were removed from office , three dismissals, and one resignation with no further action. Rufus King of Massachusetts argued that having the legislative branch pass judgment on the executive would undermine the separation of powers; better to let elections punish a President. A bad one ought to be kept in fear of them. Another issue arose regarding whether Congress might lack the resolve to try and convict a sitting President.
Presidents, some delegates observed, controlled executive appointments which ambitious Members of Congress might find desirable. Delegates to the Convention also remained undecided on the venue for impeachment trials. The Virginia Plan, which set the agenda for the Convention, initially contemplated using the judicial branch. Again, though, the founders chose to follow the British example, where the House of Commons brought charges against officers and the House of Lords considered them at trial.
Ultimately, the founders decided that during presidential impeachment trials, the House would manage the prosecution, while the Chief Justice would preside over the Senate during the trial. The founders also addressed what crimes constituted grounds for impeachment. Treason and bribery were obvious choices, but George Mason of Virginia thought those crimes did not include a large number of punishable offenses against the state. But subsequent experience demonstrated the revised phrase failed to clarify what constituted impeachable offenses.
The House brings impeachment charges against federal officials as part of its oversight and investigatory responsibilities. Individual Members of the House can introduce impeachment resolutions like ordinary bills, or the House could initiate proceedings by passing a resolution authorizing an inquiry.
The Committee on the Judiciary ordinarily has jurisdiction over impeachments, but special committees investigated charges before the Judiciary Committee was created in The committee then chooses whether to pursue articles of impeachment against the accused official and report them to the full House. If the articles are adopted by simple majority vote , the House appoints Members by resolution to manage the ensuing Senate trial on its behalf. Consequently, he is deemed to have vacated his office from the date of passing the resolution.
In another instance, the Supreme Court inquires and decides disputes or ambiguities about the election of a President as per Article 71 1 of the Indian Constitution. The Supreme Court can remove the President for the electoral misconducts or upon becoming ineligible for Lok Sabha member as laid under the Representation of the People Act, Article 4 of the Constitution of India lays down the procedure for impeachment of judges.
A Judge of the Supreme Court must be removed from his office by order of the President. Such an order needs the approval of both the Houses of Parliament. It requires a special majority of members present and voting in the same session.
The grounds of impeachment are proven misbehaviour or incapacity. It is brought to light after the submission of notice to the speaker or chairman of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha respectively.
A committee of three jurists conducts a detailed investigation. They submit the report in the next session of both the Houses of Parliament. Since the impeachment and conviction of officials involve an overturning of the routine constitutional procedures, they are usually reserved for those who have committed serious abuses of their office.
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